Several weeks ago I talked with an AU official and he told me he had still not made a recommendation for action to the AU commander. I told him I was disappointed in the lack of action and that I would be taking other measures to see the issue resolved. I called the Air Force Times about a potential story and they were interested. I also contacted Public Affairs.
Several days later, on 13 October I was notified by the ACSC commandant that an investigation into my allegation of UCMJ violation was substantiated and that "appropriate action was taken against the individual." I asked for specifics but was told the Privacy Act prevented disclosing that information to me.
I am glad to see action has been taken in this situation. I hope the deep surgery required is accomplished so the program can become a place for officers to learn, challenge each other, and adapt in a complicated world. We are at a very pivotal and important time in our service history and our senior leadership is superb. But the cultural transformational growth desired by our leadership is a challenging proposition. Much of the Air Force, in my experience, is out of touch with the challenges we face and seemingly unconcerned. The Air Force is like a rain forest in this regard. While new growth requires the light shining from above, all too often old foliage creates a canopy that blocks that light and prevents it.
ACSC should be fertile ground for Air Force officers and it has the potential to be exactly that. Hopefully measures are taken to make it so.
Sunday, October 18, 2009
Monday, October 12, 2009
Do Officers Really Need to be Educated?
There is a great article in today's Air Force Times by Rick Maze entitled, Expert: Officers Need More Time in Classroom. Reading it reminded me of a recent Tom Ricks blog post where he asked if officers were better educated with an engineering or a degree in the humanities. This is an important conversation and perhaps a decade too late.
From the Maze article:
There may have been a time when shallow but committed fighting men were more useful than their thinking counterparts. I think that time is over.
From the Maze article:
I think our military education needs serious reform as many will note reading this blog. I think the importance of "fluffy" education needs to be highlighted. It's great to study engineering and computer science and those are great skills. They are the degrees that allow a person to build something and act as a tool to create something tactically useful. But in the warfighting business, and especially in the people based COIN realm, we need reflective people who seek to understand themselves and others. Those are the people who can best use such tools to craft a strategy that wins wars.Retired Army Lt. Gen. David Barno, director of the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, said education for professional officers is “drifting off course,” partly because so much is expected of officers that there is little time for academics in a military career.
In addition, military culture — and rewards like promotions — do not put much emphasis on being brilliant, he said.
There may have been a time when shallow but committed fighting men were more useful than their thinking counterparts. I think that time is over.
Saturday, October 3, 2009
CSAF's UAS Graduation Speech
Our CSAF gave a great speech at a historical graduation ceremony days ago. In this speech he reinforced the need for cultural transformation and for officers, regardless of their tasking, to hold each other and their leadership accountable while discussing measures taken to overcome cultural inertia. This is the outstanding leadership that made my decision several months ago to volunteer to fly UAS easy. The General's historic speech is provided below:
Introduction
Thank you for that kind introduction. It truly is a pleasure for me to be here amongst a group of people who exemplify selfless service and exceptional sacrifice. Colonel Gursten, thank you for your steadfast leadership of this vital mission. I cannot overstate how important our unmanned aircraft system capabilities really are to our Joint and coalition teammates.
We are here today to pay tribute to the graduates and their families, on a truly momentous occasion: the graduation of eight students in the first “Beta test” class, two graduates directly from undergraduate pilot training, and nine new sensor operators. They have received extensive training in unmanned aircraft system fundamentals and instrument procedures, instruction on Joint firepower, and qualifications in their respective positions.
We also give much-deserved thanks to those who made it all happen: the instructors. Being an instructor is not easy, but have no doubt: you are fulfilling a crucial responsibility that every profession shares in common. For us, that is to qualify a next generation of Air Force warrior professionals. I have no doubt that you have performed admirably, and that you have positioned this new war-fighting discipline for a future, far better than you found it. Teaching your students and transferring all the important lessons you have learned is a testament to all – students and teachers alike – so I commend you for your indispensible efforts.
A Significant Milestone
Today marks another significant milestone in our history with unmanned aircraft. Some here might be surprised to discover that this history actually extends beyond the recent past, in which we have seen unmanned systems emerge into real prominence. Our first sustained use of unmanned aerial vehicles actually occurred during Vietnam, where we flew over 3,400 reconnaissance sorties, between 1964 and 1975, with the Ryan 147 “Lightning Bug.” True to our spirit of innovation and creativity, the “Lightning Bug” was a modified target drone, air-launched from a C-130 and recovered in mid-air by helicopter. Its evolution began in earnest, after the Soviets shot down U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers in 1960; and, although primitive by today‟s standards, these early UAVs proved extremely useful, taking detailed pictures of surface-to-air missile sites, enemy airfields, and ship activity in Haiphong Harbor – all places that were too dangerous for manned aircraft to fly.
Notwithstanding their significant contributions during the war, these UAVs were considered “untested” after the war ended, and did not fare well during the military drawdown. As a result, continued funding of these unmanned aircraft proved to be problematic, as they could not compete for scarce dollars, against proven platforms and weapons of the day, like the B-52 and cruise missiles. In that environment, making the case for an operational need to pursue an expensive and time-consuming development program was difficult. Then-Undersecretary of the Air Force James Plummer, in 1975, noted that “we are going to be cautious about initiating a vehicle development program where we don‟t have a good idea of the technological status and requirements of a support system. We simply cannot justify spending money to prove a concept which may have marginal utility.”
How times have changed.
Obviously, today, we are not talking about marginal utility; indeed, the demand for game-changing, UAV-borne capabilities is insatiable, and shows no sign of abating. General Petraeus has called these contributions “invaluable” in recent combat operations; and, as you know here at Creech, better than anyone else in our Air Force, we‟re flying them non-stop because of their extraordinary value. Our MQ-1 fleet has logged over 600,000 hours; and while this number by itself is impressive, the accelerated rate at which we‟ve accumulated these hours is really the remarkable story. It took us 12 years – from 1995 to 2007 – to fly our first 250,000 Predator hours. In less than two years, we flew our next 250,000 hours; and, we are on track to log the next quarter million in only 13 months.
As we continue significant investments in these aircraft – 320 in the next 5 years – and immediately deploy almost all of them to fly continuous combat air patrols, or “CAPs,” for our Joint and coalition teammates, these flying hours will only continue to multiply. We have come a long way since we started with only one CAP in 2001. After the Joint team realized how vital these aircraft were, they requested more; and, we have delivered, surging nearly everything that we have directly into theater. We‟re now flying 37 CAPs in Iraq and Afghanistan, and we‟re on track to provide 50 by the end of 2011.
Meeting the Demand
This unbelievable surge would not have been possible without the professional Airmen sitting here today. In the face of adversity, you delivered, and you should be very proud of your efforts. I sure am.
To support further expansion of this critical warfighting capability, we will need more men and women like you, because the reality is, even though we call these aircraft systems “unmanned,” they are anything but that. This system, in fact, is quite manpower intensive. To support each new CAP, we will need 140 more Airmen, half of whom are intelligence professionals to process the raw data, exploit and fuse it with other sources, and disseminate actionable information to the field. Each new CAP also requires at least seven vehicle operators and seven sensor operators – ideally, ten each, to avoid the surge conditions that you‟ve been experiencing for an extended period here.
I know that our attempts to meet the requirements of the Joint team caused a strain on our force, on you, and your families; and, I appreciate that while our force is resilient, it is not unbreakable. Therefore, the concerns of this budding UAS career field is a top priority of Air Force leadership, including Secretary Donley and me, especially as we know that we have only scratched the surface of the capabilities that our unmanned systems can provide. Industry has already refueled an unmanned aircraft and demonstrated multi-aircraft control – all feats that only a few contemplated 10 years ago. Given these technological leaps forward, it‟s not hard to imagine a multitude of other missions for our unmanned aircraft, including air transport, air refueling, suppressing enemy air defenses, forward air control, combat search and rescue, and more. It also is not difficult to imagine new operational concepts, such as groups of unmanned aircraft flying “swarm” tactics, or unmanned aircraft teaming with and being controlled by manned aircraft.
If we are to continue meeting these operational requirements that are likely to emerge, we must be prepared to address a multitude of institutional and cultural issues. Among other things, we will start by taking inventory of the successes of this Beta class, and noting those areas where we can improve, to ensure that UAS Airmen will have appropriate training, and are provided with the skills and qualifications that are necessary to succeed. Some of these imperatives are clear, like the need to comply with Federal Aviation Administration instrument rating requirements in the national airspace. Others are more ambiguous; but, as we continue down this path, we‟ll refine our training programs and personnel policies to ensure that they produce and sustain the fully-qualified UAS professionals who will make, among other things, serving as the Al Qaeda operations officer a very, very high-risk endeavor.
Institutional and Cultural Shift
Almost every new adventure begins with a period of austerity and uncertainty. I understand that there are issues with assignments, professional development, advancement, and leadership opportunities. I want to assure you that your concerns have not fallen on deaf ears.
Senator John McCain – of course, a former aviator – asked me about these implications during this May‟s Air Force posture hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee. There, he noted that it was a “seminal time” in the history of the Air Force, and asked if the transition to unmanned aircraft would be a “significant cultural adjustment” for the Air Force. I answered him then, in the same way that I do to you today: you are part of the major new Air Force development of the decade. This cultural change for our Air Force has to do both with the future of these unmanned systems, and how we see ourselves as Airmen. Secretary Donley and I recognize that our Airmen are the linchpin in this shift, and we are giving it our personal attention. I promise you that our efforts to ensure that we take care of you and your families is worthy of your exceptional commitment and continuing sacrifice.
Earlier this year, in June, we celebrated another great accomplishment, with the graduation of our first group of unmanned “patch wearers” from our UAS Weapons School squadron. These tactical experts will further professionalize this community by ensuring that our tactics, techniques, and procedures are sound, and that they are fully integrated with all other Air Force war-fighting disciplines and, as we grow technical expertise from within the community, we will focus too on developing our future UAS leaders. Experience has shown that those who are steeped in the unique technical and cultural considerations of the community will be more effective leaders, and so, we will look to create our future UAS commanders from within the career field, and consider these skilled operators for opportunities equal to those of other career paths.
Be proud that you are the new group of Airmen-warriors, who provide unmatched situational awareness of the battle space to field commanders – who, although operating in a somewhat different setting, must maintain equal vigilance for our teammates in the field; for you must be ready not only to find and fix a target, but if necessary, you also must be prepared to make it go away. You are blazing a trail toward the Air Force of the future – one with a mix of manned and unmanned systems, all of equal value – and you will be in the front row to history, with the game-changing capabilities that you provide.
Conclusion
We are at a critical point for our Air Force – one of transition and uncertainties, but also of immense opportunities. Critical issues, such as tapping the full potential of cyberspace; providing a mix of capabilities to address high-end, low-end, and hybrid threats; and balancing manned and unmanned platforms, face our Air Force, and have profound implications for our future. These and other issues are being addressed in Washington, in academia, in think tanks, and in the media; and, on the manned-unmanned issue, no more importantly anywhere, than here at Creech. It is you and your families who are living this transformation.
We applaud your efforts as the vanguard into this new and uncharted territory; we appreciate the sacrifices that you are making daily; and, we are working on addressing the institutional and cultural inertia that faces any new innovation. When the steamship, the tank, and yes, the aircraft, were introduced for military application, institutional disorder resulted. When Billy Mitchell insisted that aircraft would be more effective in sinking ships, the notion was considered preposterous, and he was dismissed as a zealot. When Robert Goddard dreamt of traveling beyond Earth‟s atmosphere, where aircraft could not depend on lift and drag, the military resisted him, and he was marginalized for talking about space travel and missile technology. The UAS community encountered the same sort of resistance, even in our own Air Force. In the words of one Air Force official, after the end of the Vietnam War, “How can you be a „tiger‟ sitting behind a console?”
Certainly, there no longer is any doubt about the value of unmanned systems, and of the critical work that you do – and, where the “tigers” reside.
All relevant organizations must adapt to new realities, and here, the reality is an insatiable demand for UAS-borne capabilities, and an evolving relationship between people, machines, and the sky. The technology that initially propelled us toward the skies is now making possible machines that outpace the capabilities of the people we put in them. So, although we have some issues to overcome, know this: the success of our Air Force and our Joint team depend on your personal and professional efforts. There is no doubt of your value to the success of our mission. We are throwing you into the fight quickly. You soon may be called to provide a ground commander with the ability to search a village; to survey areas that, due to rough terrain, are inaccessible to ground forces; or, to pinpoint enemy forces.
Regardless of your tasking, my charge to you is: be vigilant; be unrelenting; and, expect nothing short of peak performance from yourselves, your teammates, and yes, your leaders – including this one, and Secretary Donley. We will be, as always, unwavering champions of your efforts, and stewards of your trust. Celebrate our great tradition of innovation and creativity, and look to improve your processes and procedures. Realize and harness your individual brilliance, so that you may develop and leverage your collective genius, as a proud community of UAS Airmen.
Your training here has laid the groundwork. Now, we depend on you to go forth and execute the mission with utmost discipline, precision, and reliability.
Thank you very much for inviting me to speak to you today. I appreciate all that you do, and all that you will do, for our national defense; and, to the families and friends here today, thank you for your enormous sacrifice, which never goes unnoticed. Your service is to be admired, respected, emulated, and supported by the larger Air Force family, on whom – I assure you – you can faithfully rely.
Thank you.
- General Norton Schwartz, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, 25 September 2009
Introduction
Thank you for that kind introduction. It truly is a pleasure for me to be here amongst a group of people who exemplify selfless service and exceptional sacrifice. Colonel Gursten, thank you for your steadfast leadership of this vital mission. I cannot overstate how important our unmanned aircraft system capabilities really are to our Joint and coalition teammates.
We are here today to pay tribute to the graduates and their families, on a truly momentous occasion: the graduation of eight students in the first “Beta test” class, two graduates directly from undergraduate pilot training, and nine new sensor operators. They have received extensive training in unmanned aircraft system fundamentals and instrument procedures, instruction on Joint firepower, and qualifications in their respective positions.
We also give much-deserved thanks to those who made it all happen: the instructors. Being an instructor is not easy, but have no doubt: you are fulfilling a crucial responsibility that every profession shares in common. For us, that is to qualify a next generation of Air Force warrior professionals. I have no doubt that you have performed admirably, and that you have positioned this new war-fighting discipline for a future, far better than you found it. Teaching your students and transferring all the important lessons you have learned is a testament to all – students and teachers alike – so I commend you for your indispensible efforts.
A Significant Milestone
Today marks another significant milestone in our history with unmanned aircraft. Some here might be surprised to discover that this history actually extends beyond the recent past, in which we have seen unmanned systems emerge into real prominence. Our first sustained use of unmanned aerial vehicles actually occurred during Vietnam, where we flew over 3,400 reconnaissance sorties, between 1964 and 1975, with the Ryan 147 “Lightning Bug.” True to our spirit of innovation and creativity, the “Lightning Bug” was a modified target drone, air-launched from a C-130 and recovered in mid-air by helicopter. Its evolution began in earnest, after the Soviets shot down U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers in 1960; and, although primitive by today‟s standards, these early UAVs proved extremely useful, taking detailed pictures of surface-to-air missile sites, enemy airfields, and ship activity in Haiphong Harbor – all places that were too dangerous for manned aircraft to fly.
Notwithstanding their significant contributions during the war, these UAVs were considered “untested” after the war ended, and did not fare well during the military drawdown. As a result, continued funding of these unmanned aircraft proved to be problematic, as they could not compete for scarce dollars, against proven platforms and weapons of the day, like the B-52 and cruise missiles. In that environment, making the case for an operational need to pursue an expensive and time-consuming development program was difficult. Then-Undersecretary of the Air Force James Plummer, in 1975, noted that “we are going to be cautious about initiating a vehicle development program where we don‟t have a good idea of the technological status and requirements of a support system. We simply cannot justify spending money to prove a concept which may have marginal utility.”
How times have changed.
Obviously, today, we are not talking about marginal utility; indeed, the demand for game-changing, UAV-borne capabilities is insatiable, and shows no sign of abating. General Petraeus has called these contributions “invaluable” in recent combat operations; and, as you know here at Creech, better than anyone else in our Air Force, we‟re flying them non-stop because of their extraordinary value. Our MQ-1 fleet has logged over 600,000 hours; and while this number by itself is impressive, the accelerated rate at which we‟ve accumulated these hours is really the remarkable story. It took us 12 years – from 1995 to 2007 – to fly our first 250,000 Predator hours. In less than two years, we flew our next 250,000 hours; and, we are on track to log the next quarter million in only 13 months.
As we continue significant investments in these aircraft – 320 in the next 5 years – and immediately deploy almost all of them to fly continuous combat air patrols, or “CAPs,” for our Joint and coalition teammates, these flying hours will only continue to multiply. We have come a long way since we started with only one CAP in 2001. After the Joint team realized how vital these aircraft were, they requested more; and, we have delivered, surging nearly everything that we have directly into theater. We‟re now flying 37 CAPs in Iraq and Afghanistan, and we‟re on track to provide 50 by the end of 2011.
Meeting the Demand
This unbelievable surge would not have been possible without the professional Airmen sitting here today. In the face of adversity, you delivered, and you should be very proud of your efforts. I sure am.
To support further expansion of this critical warfighting capability, we will need more men and women like you, because the reality is, even though we call these aircraft systems “unmanned,” they are anything but that. This system, in fact, is quite manpower intensive. To support each new CAP, we will need 140 more Airmen, half of whom are intelligence professionals to process the raw data, exploit and fuse it with other sources, and disseminate actionable information to the field. Each new CAP also requires at least seven vehicle operators and seven sensor operators – ideally, ten each, to avoid the surge conditions that you‟ve been experiencing for an extended period here.
I know that our attempts to meet the requirements of the Joint team caused a strain on our force, on you, and your families; and, I appreciate that while our force is resilient, it is not unbreakable. Therefore, the concerns of this budding UAS career field is a top priority of Air Force leadership, including Secretary Donley and me, especially as we know that we have only scratched the surface of the capabilities that our unmanned systems can provide. Industry has already refueled an unmanned aircraft and demonstrated multi-aircraft control – all feats that only a few contemplated 10 years ago. Given these technological leaps forward, it‟s not hard to imagine a multitude of other missions for our unmanned aircraft, including air transport, air refueling, suppressing enemy air defenses, forward air control, combat search and rescue, and more. It also is not difficult to imagine new operational concepts, such as groups of unmanned aircraft flying “swarm” tactics, or unmanned aircraft teaming with and being controlled by manned aircraft.
If we are to continue meeting these operational requirements that are likely to emerge, we must be prepared to address a multitude of institutional and cultural issues. Among other things, we will start by taking inventory of the successes of this Beta class, and noting those areas where we can improve, to ensure that UAS Airmen will have appropriate training, and are provided with the skills and qualifications that are necessary to succeed. Some of these imperatives are clear, like the need to comply with Federal Aviation Administration instrument rating requirements in the national airspace. Others are more ambiguous; but, as we continue down this path, we‟ll refine our training programs and personnel policies to ensure that they produce and sustain the fully-qualified UAS professionals who will make, among other things, serving as the Al Qaeda operations officer a very, very high-risk endeavor.
Institutional and Cultural Shift
Almost every new adventure begins with a period of austerity and uncertainty. I understand that there are issues with assignments, professional development, advancement, and leadership opportunities. I want to assure you that your concerns have not fallen on deaf ears.
Senator John McCain – of course, a former aviator – asked me about these implications during this May‟s Air Force posture hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee. There, he noted that it was a “seminal time” in the history of the Air Force, and asked if the transition to unmanned aircraft would be a “significant cultural adjustment” for the Air Force. I answered him then, in the same way that I do to you today: you are part of the major new Air Force development of the decade. This cultural change for our Air Force has to do both with the future of these unmanned systems, and how we see ourselves as Airmen. Secretary Donley and I recognize that our Airmen are the linchpin in this shift, and we are giving it our personal attention. I promise you that our efforts to ensure that we take care of you and your families is worthy of your exceptional commitment and continuing sacrifice.
Earlier this year, in June, we celebrated another great accomplishment, with the graduation of our first group of unmanned “patch wearers” from our UAS Weapons School squadron. These tactical experts will further professionalize this community by ensuring that our tactics, techniques, and procedures are sound, and that they are fully integrated with all other Air Force war-fighting disciplines and, as we grow technical expertise from within the community, we will focus too on developing our future UAS leaders. Experience has shown that those who are steeped in the unique technical and cultural considerations of the community will be more effective leaders, and so, we will look to create our future UAS commanders from within the career field, and consider these skilled operators for opportunities equal to those of other career paths.
Be proud that you are the new group of Airmen-warriors, who provide unmatched situational awareness of the battle space to field commanders – who, although operating in a somewhat different setting, must maintain equal vigilance for our teammates in the field; for you must be ready not only to find and fix a target, but if necessary, you also must be prepared to make it go away. You are blazing a trail toward the Air Force of the future – one with a mix of manned and unmanned systems, all of equal value – and you will be in the front row to history, with the game-changing capabilities that you provide.
Conclusion
We are at a critical point for our Air Force – one of transition and uncertainties, but also of immense opportunities. Critical issues, such as tapping the full potential of cyberspace; providing a mix of capabilities to address high-end, low-end, and hybrid threats; and balancing manned and unmanned platforms, face our Air Force, and have profound implications for our future. These and other issues are being addressed in Washington, in academia, in think tanks, and in the media; and, on the manned-unmanned issue, no more importantly anywhere, than here at Creech. It is you and your families who are living this transformation.
We applaud your efforts as the vanguard into this new and uncharted territory; we appreciate the sacrifices that you are making daily; and, we are working on addressing the institutional and cultural inertia that faces any new innovation. When the steamship, the tank, and yes, the aircraft, were introduced for military application, institutional disorder resulted. When Billy Mitchell insisted that aircraft would be more effective in sinking ships, the notion was considered preposterous, and he was dismissed as a zealot. When Robert Goddard dreamt of traveling beyond Earth‟s atmosphere, where aircraft could not depend on lift and drag, the military resisted him, and he was marginalized for talking about space travel and missile technology. The UAS community encountered the same sort of resistance, even in our own Air Force. In the words of one Air Force official, after the end of the Vietnam War, “How can you be a „tiger‟ sitting behind a console?”
Certainly, there no longer is any doubt about the value of unmanned systems, and of the critical work that you do – and, where the “tigers” reside.
All relevant organizations must adapt to new realities, and here, the reality is an insatiable demand for UAS-borne capabilities, and an evolving relationship between people, machines, and the sky. The technology that initially propelled us toward the skies is now making possible machines that outpace the capabilities of the people we put in them. So, although we have some issues to overcome, know this: the success of our Air Force and our Joint team depend on your personal and professional efforts. There is no doubt of your value to the success of our mission. We are throwing you into the fight quickly. You soon may be called to provide a ground commander with the ability to search a village; to survey areas that, due to rough terrain, are inaccessible to ground forces; or, to pinpoint enemy forces.
Regardless of your tasking, my charge to you is: be vigilant; be unrelenting; and, expect nothing short of peak performance from yourselves, your teammates, and yes, your leaders – including this one, and Secretary Donley. We will be, as always, unwavering champions of your efforts, and stewards of your trust. Celebrate our great tradition of innovation and creativity, and look to improve your processes and procedures. Realize and harness your individual brilliance, so that you may develop and leverage your collective genius, as a proud community of UAS Airmen.
Your training here has laid the groundwork. Now, we depend on you to go forth and execute the mission with utmost discipline, precision, and reliability.
Thank you very much for inviting me to speak to you today. I appreciate all that you do, and all that you will do, for our national defense; and, to the families and friends here today, thank you for your enormous sacrifice, which never goes unnoticed. Your service is to be admired, respected, emulated, and supported by the larger Air Force family, on whom – I assure you – you can faithfully rely.
Thank you.
- General Norton Schwartz, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, 25 September 2009
Wednesday, September 2, 2009
ACSC/DL Should Lose its Accreditation
I am now of the opinion the Air Command and Staff College Distance Learning (ACSC/DL) program should lose its accreditation for a master's degree. The Southern Association of Colleges and Schools which accredits the degree has the following faculty requirement in its Principles of Accreditation. According to the document, several principles need to be "enforced by the institution" including this requirement:
“The institution ensures adequate procedures for safeguarding and protecting academic freedom.”
The academic freedom violation referred to here was elevated to the Air University (AU) Chief Academic Officer more than two months ago in accordance with AUI 36-2308. Despite the violation being a textbook case of non-attribution violation with a clear punitive intent and regardless of the admission of violation made by the student to the course instructor, the AU Chief Academic Officer has not even made a recommendation to the AU commander. The offending officer's emails soured my chain of command, prompted negative action from a general officer in that chain, and reportedly included an email sent from a CSAF executive officer which found its way to my immediate supervisor. It's amazing to me that no action has been taken. I suppose the offending student will have completed with his degree soon enough and then any punishment will likely not matter. The consistent lack of action leads me to the conclusion that academic freedom is not provided or protected in the ACSC/DL program and it appears it may be lacking in Air University itself. For these reasons, I believe ACSC/DL should lose its accreditation.
ACSC/DL leadership refused to remove the field grade officer from the class for his violation (demonstrating they were unconcerned with the threat he posed to the other students in the class) and instead they censored me from being able to post in the online course discussion. Why did they censor me?
It seems to me they wanted to punish me over a battle I was fighting with ACSC/DL concerning their Cultural Studies course instructor (who used to be an associate Dean of Air War College) who had established a punitive environment and acted unprofessionally in the course. A half dozen other field grade officers in the course also supported my complaint. At least one field grade officer in the class filed a separate complaint. Despite words and assurances ACSC/DL leadership refused to remedy the situation.
It's definitely not just me. I was recently contacted by another field grade officer who read this blog and he detailed a very similar experience with the same Cultural Studies course instructor. He also described similar comments from ACSC/DL leadership regarding the instructor. He was still angry from the outcome months after the issue so much so that he began searching the internet to see if others had experienced the same thing. That is how he found this blog. He says he will post his experiences in a comment shortly.
I find myself wondering why ACSC/DL leadership doesn't truly value feedback and why they don't act on it from multiple field grade officers to make the program better. Perhaps they don't think the Air Force yet faces enough challenges. Whatever the reason, this particular situation is a trend item and symptomatic of a failure of leadership and a culture in need of serious reform. Air University has significant cultural problems and it doesn't appear to be in a rush to fix the issues. AUI 36-2308 states:
"If satisfactory resolution is not obtained at the organization or activity level, the individual may elevate the complaint to the Air University Chief Academic Officer (AU/CF), who will, in coordination with the AU Legal Office (AU/JA), review the case and provide a recommendation to the AU Commander (AU/CC). The decision of the AU Commander is final."
Unfortunately it doesn't specify a timeline. It seems academic freedom isn't really important when an unpopular voice dissents against somebody in the club that runs the Air Force. I hope I'm wrong but there is absolutely nothing in my experience with this pretend academic institution to inspire optimism.
“The institution ensures adequate procedures for safeguarding and protecting academic freedom.”
The academic freedom violation referred to here was elevated to the Air University (AU) Chief Academic Officer more than two months ago in accordance with AUI 36-2308. Despite the violation being a textbook case of non-attribution violation with a clear punitive intent and regardless of the admission of violation made by the student to the course instructor, the AU Chief Academic Officer has not even made a recommendation to the AU commander. The offending officer's emails soured my chain of command, prompted negative action from a general officer in that chain, and reportedly included an email sent from a CSAF executive officer which found its way to my immediate supervisor. It's amazing to me that no action has been taken. I suppose the offending student will have completed with his degree soon enough and then any punishment will likely not matter. The consistent lack of action leads me to the conclusion that academic freedom is not provided or protected in the ACSC/DL program and it appears it may be lacking in Air University itself. For these reasons, I believe ACSC/DL should lose its accreditation.
ACSC/DL leadership refused to remove the field grade officer from the class for his violation (demonstrating they were unconcerned with the threat he posed to the other students in the class) and instead they censored me from being able to post in the online course discussion. Why did they censor me?
It seems to me they wanted to punish me over a battle I was fighting with ACSC/DL concerning their Cultural Studies course instructor (who used to be an associate Dean of Air War College) who had established a punitive environment and acted unprofessionally in the course. A half dozen other field grade officers in the course also supported my complaint. At least one field grade officer in the class filed a separate complaint. Despite words and assurances ACSC/DL leadership refused to remedy the situation.
It's definitely not just me. I was recently contacted by another field grade officer who read this blog and he detailed a very similar experience with the same Cultural Studies course instructor. He also described similar comments from ACSC/DL leadership regarding the instructor. He was still angry from the outcome months after the issue so much so that he began searching the internet to see if others had experienced the same thing. That is how he found this blog. He says he will post his experiences in a comment shortly.
I find myself wondering why ACSC/DL leadership doesn't truly value feedback and why they don't act on it from multiple field grade officers to make the program better. Perhaps they don't think the Air Force yet faces enough challenges. Whatever the reason, this particular situation is a trend item and symptomatic of a failure of leadership and a culture in need of serious reform. Air University has significant cultural problems and it doesn't appear to be in a rush to fix the issues. AUI 36-2308 states:
"If satisfactory resolution is not obtained at the organization or activity level, the individual may elevate the complaint to the Air University Chief Academic Officer (AU/CF), who will, in coordination with the AU Legal Office (AU/JA), review the case and provide a recommendation to the AU Commander (AU/CC). The decision of the AU Commander is final."
Unfortunately it doesn't specify a timeline. It seems academic freedom isn't really important when an unpopular voice dissents against somebody in the club that runs the Air Force. I hope I'm wrong but there is absolutely nothing in my experience with this pretend academic institution to inspire optimism.
Saturday, August 22, 2009
Academic Freedom and Max Performing a Culture
In his speech given to the "Leadership and Intellectual Center of the Air Force," Secretary Gates spoke of the need for critical cultural reflection to change elements that no longer proved useful while maintaining cultural elements that give strength and provide motivation. My cultural analysis of the fighter pilot culture indicates that there are multiple cultural elements in which the line between strength and weakness is thin indeed. On one side is strength garnered by pride while on the other is blindness reaped from arrogance. The motivation garnered from an intense emphasis on social life carries the potential downside of group think. And so on...
It is apparent to me the fighter pilot community is max performing their culture as they max perform their jets. They should be commended for this aggressive attitude and their mission hacking perfectionism that seeks to squeeze every inch of motivation from their people during challenging times of do ___ with less.
But the line has been traversed, it seems to me, and the air has already started to seperate from the wing. The community is no longer max performing its culture. Instead, they are stalling it out. It is evident to me that instead of maximizing people for the betterment of the mission, the aggressive fighter pilot culture is failing to supply the creativity, debate, and discussion necessary to help the Air Force recover from a deep stall (some might argue a spin). Instead, the homogenized community is "staying the course" with the assembly line talking points and refusal to engage in serious discussion--in much of my experience at any rate.
It can't be easy to max perform a culture. But we need to keep the fire trucks from rolling.
It is apparent to me the fighter pilot community is max performing their culture as they max perform their jets. They should be commended for this aggressive attitude and their mission hacking perfectionism that seeks to squeeze every inch of motivation from their people during challenging times of do ___ with less.
But the line has been traversed, it seems to me, and the air has already started to seperate from the wing. The community is no longer max performing its culture. Instead, they are stalling it out. It is evident to me that instead of maximizing people for the betterment of the mission, the aggressive fighter pilot culture is failing to supply the creativity, debate, and discussion necessary to help the Air Force recover from a deep stall (some might argue a spin). Instead, the homogenized community is "staying the course" with the assembly line talking points and refusal to engage in serious discussion--in much of my experience at any rate.
It can't be easy to max perform a culture. But we need to keep the fire trucks from rolling.
Tuesday, August 18, 2009
My Thesis, Criticism, and Role of Social Life to a Fighter Pilot
I'm writing the first draft of my thesis and have tenatively entitled it, "The Smartest Guys in the Room and the Best of the Best: An Exploration of Air Force Culture" and hope to have a good draft by the end of the week.
I want to reiterate my gratitude to my critics. I have actually used some critiques already in the writing. I hope the criticisms continue and I'll be posting brief items here throughout the week asking for criticisms and different viewpoints.
For example, two major sources I am using to "let the culture speak for itself" include Jon's book, "Christian Fighter Pilot is Not an Oxymoron" and the "American Fighter Pilot" reality TV show that aired on network TV. The strengths of these sources, in my view, include:
Also for your consideration and discussion are these three quotes from the American Fighter Pilot reality TV show. What exactly is the role and proper place of the social life within the fighter pilot culture? Assuming a baseline Air Force officer that has already been theoretically vetted for ethical and basic social skills, what more is required to be integral in the fighter pilot community? Any sources that I can use to support your viewpoint are much appreciated.
I want to reiterate my gratitude to my critics. I have actually used some critiques already in the writing. I hope the criticisms continue and I'll be posting brief items here throughout the week asking for criticisms and different viewpoints.
For example, two major sources I am using to "let the culture speak for itself" include Jon's book, "Christian Fighter Pilot is Not an Oxymoron" and the "American Fighter Pilot" reality TV show that aired on network TV. The strengths of these sources, in my view, include:
- They are recent looks at fighter pilot culture instead of based on Vietnam era personalities
- They both come loaded with descriptions of fighter pilot culture from fighter pilots
- In the case of the AFP reality TV show it was heavily supported by the Air Force and the F-15C community (at least within AETC) and is probably the best cultural representation of the community to the public despite its lack of success on the networks
Also for your consideration and discussion are these three quotes from the American Fighter Pilot reality TV show. What exactly is the role and proper place of the social life within the fighter pilot culture? Assuming a baseline Air Force officer that has already been theoretically vetted for ethical and basic social skills, what more is required to be integral in the fighter pilot community? Any sources that I can use to support your viewpoint are much appreciated.
"No matter how good these guys might be in the jet, if they can't fit in socially they can't be an American fighter pilot and in this course that means you won't graduate."
- Captain Robert "Shark" Garland, Chief F-15C Instructor Pilot and Weapons Officer
"It doesn't matter what you drive, it doesn't matter how you look the only thing that matters is being able to successfully execute in this weapons system and be an integral part of our community. That's what matters."
- Captain Robert "Shark" Garland, Chief F-15C Instructor Pilot and Weapons Officer
"If we don't respect a guy or don't like a guy so much, it makes it difficult for us to put that trust in him or to put our lives in his hands."
- Captain Robert "Shark" Garland, Chief F-15C Instructor Pilot and Weapons Officer
- Captain Robert "Shark" Garland, Chief F-15C Instructor Pilot and Weapons Officer
"It doesn't matter what you drive, it doesn't matter how you look the only thing that matters is being able to successfully execute in this weapons system and be an integral part of our community. That's what matters."
- Captain Robert "Shark" Garland, Chief F-15C Instructor Pilot and Weapons Officer
"If we don't respect a guy or don't like a guy so much, it makes it difficult for us to put that trust in him or to put our lives in his hands."
- Captain Robert "Shark" Garland, Chief F-15C Instructor Pilot and Weapons Officer
Monday, August 10, 2009
General McPeak Gives F-15C Standard Argument
The retired CSAF and F-15C General McPeak recently published an editorial in the Wall Street Journal. He gave the standard F-15C argument that we need more F-22s, air superiority depends on it, and echoed the flag officer I witnessed address AETC student pilots who referred to our current wars as "skirmishes" and said we need to focus on enemies like China. General McPeak said:
"We have forced anyone with a bone to pick with us to find an alternative to high-end, conventional war. We’ve had to invent a vocabulary for this low end: 'asymmetrical' conflict, it being another poorly understood activity. But it seems clear that in this sort of war our existence is not threatened, that we can regulate the resource input. It can be expensive in men and material, but we cannot be defeated militarily."
I have to disagree with the General on the clarity he claims for asymmetrical warfare not threatening our existence. There are a number of ways that it could change our existence. Such warfare might act as the catalyst for internal strife which could change our national character as we continue to forget what makes our country great (a higher standard, lamp on the hill, the love of liberty). It can threaten us financially as we pour money and treasure into an endless pit reminiscent of that which felled the Soviet Union. The General might argue against my points stating these are further reasons why we should end these "skirmishes" and concentrate on the big industrial fish. Unfortunately there is a more direct counterpoint to the General's assertion that asymmetrical warfare cannot defeat us militarily and it involves chemical and nuclear weapons. It would be a grave mistake to minimize this difficult warfare in order to continue to train for the easy warfare at which we excel.
"We have forced anyone with a bone to pick with us to find an alternative to high-end, conventional war. We’ve had to invent a vocabulary for this low end: 'asymmetrical' conflict, it being another poorly understood activity. But it seems clear that in this sort of war our existence is not threatened, that we can regulate the resource input. It can be expensive in men and material, but we cannot be defeated militarily."
I have to disagree with the General on the clarity he claims for asymmetrical warfare not threatening our existence. There are a number of ways that it could change our existence. Such warfare might act as the catalyst for internal strife which could change our national character as we continue to forget what makes our country great (a higher standard, lamp on the hill, the love of liberty). It can threaten us financially as we pour money and treasure into an endless pit reminiscent of that which felled the Soviet Union. The General might argue against my points stating these are further reasons why we should end these "skirmishes" and concentrate on the big industrial fish. Unfortunately there is a more direct counterpoint to the General's assertion that asymmetrical warfare cannot defeat us militarily and it involves chemical and nuclear weapons. It would be a grave mistake to minimize this difficult warfare in order to continue to train for the easy warfare at which we excel.
Sunday, August 9, 2009
The USAFA Chapel as Symbol of Morality
I just got back from a beautiful wedding at the Air Force Academy chapel to witness a principled young friend make an important life decision. The chapel is as gorgeous as has been described to me and despite lacking much of an artistic streak I really enjoyed viewing its design. The structure's sharp edges and solid metallic form remind me of something Howard Roark might have crafted. The stern almost surgical composition of the building in my mind represents an unwavering, objective and principled morality such as that demanded by the institution's honor code. The beautiful integration of the stain glass reminds me of our imperfect human natures and the expanse of open glass highlights the importance of light and transparency.
The transparent light streaming into the structure illuminates the structure and greatly magnifies its brilliance. It seems to me that this structure, like the integrity and morality it represents, requires this light.
The transparent light streaming into the structure illuminates the structure and greatly magnifies its brilliance. It seems to me that this structure, like the integrity and morality it represents, requires this light.
Friday, August 7, 2009
Update on ACSC/DL Academic Freedom Violation
First I want to give sincere thanks to those that commented on my previous post. That essay was written some time ago for an ACSC/DL class as part of PME discussion. It wasn’t part of an assignment but rather was an attempt to start a discussion with my peers and especially those from the fighter side of the house. As the comments in the previous post demonstrate, it wasn’t a model of research or academic inquiry and has several flaws. For those reasons I had no intention of posting it here. But a fighter pilot critic wanted to see it so I strapped on a thick skin, posted it, and took some well deserved spears. I believe its main claim that UAS are more capable and cheaper than manned counterparts and can be realized more quickly if cultural and political changes are made in the Air Force remains unblemished. The recently released Air Force “UAS Flight Plan” report paints a similar vision. Still my diatribe was weak in several areas and the commentary of several on this blog highlighted them. I thank them for their criticism.
That was the process that should have taken place in my online PME discussion but for the most part did not. Instead of having my views challenged and the weaknesses of my assertions highlighted, the ACSC/DL process resulted in an F-15C pilot privately telling me I should talk to my OG/CC to have my views challenged after sending my views out to poison my chain of command. Ironically, instead of conventionally debating me online or in person he chose the asymmetrical approach of fighting me using the “bro network.” Like an enemy that surrounds and fades into the crowd… Such asymmetrical battles allow for a less capable foe to turn his adversary’s strength into a weakness. These encounters are typically political in nature even when they take on the violent dimension. As might be imagined, politics is not my strong suit. Asymmetrical fights are essentially about ideas and values and require dialog, honesty, self-reflection, and creativity to win and I think I have some strengths in that area. But the political reality of such conflict strongly dictates that being right doesn’t guarantee success.
Some have and will claim my detailing of the academic freedom violation is merely whining. I think it’s more than that. I recently learned from an anonymous source that one of the email chains actually went from a CSAF executive officer (F-15C pilot) to a group of Eagle Drivers and then found its way directly into my chain of command. Email chains have popped up from the original violation and have found their way throughout my current command and despite its widespread proliferation not one person has contacted me about the discussion (other than my boss at the direction of a two-star). Even when I directly email the participants of chain emails provided to me and extend an invitation for a professional discussion to the writers I get no response. Many have shown willingness to negatively comment, insult, and pass along emails but have avoided any serious discussion of the ideas with me. If Air Force officers refuse to debate professional differences how likely is it they will be able to bring the leadership skills necessary to win the hearts and minds warfare we find ourselves engaged in now? And what is the role of our Professional Military Education in providing these skills to officers charged with winning our nation’s wars?
My professional discussion in my ACSC/DL course turned into a hit order spread across the Internet--exactly the kind of thing Air University academic freedom policy is supposed to prevent but did not. In fact, the F-15C pilot wasn’t even removed from the class despite admitting his violation even after evidence his actions infected my chain of command at the two-star level. My year in the program has demonstrated without question that ACSC/DL does not value academic freedom. That “institution” is a poster pinned to a cardboard backing with no structure or substance behind it. It is an empty shell of a program that epitomizes perception at the expense of reality and likely does more harm to the education of military officers than it does good. It is only after ACSC/DL leadership refused to remove the student from the class that I realized the program was rotten to the core and I would have to find another way to discuss ideas with peers. This blog was born of the failure of ACSC/DL to provide a basic forum for military officers to discuss and share their experiences and thoughts.
The petition for redress for my academic freedom violation was elevated to the Air University level a month and a half ago. There has still been no resolution to the issue and as far as I know the F-15C pilot hasn’t been removed from courses where he is still free to issue hits on anybody he disagrees with. I can’t help but wonder how long it takes to investigate a case with a smoking gun and a signed confession.
That was the process that should have taken place in my online PME discussion but for the most part did not. Instead of having my views challenged and the weaknesses of my assertions highlighted, the ACSC/DL process resulted in an F-15C pilot privately telling me I should talk to my OG/CC to have my views challenged after sending my views out to poison my chain of command. Ironically, instead of conventionally debating me online or in person he chose the asymmetrical approach of fighting me using the “bro network.” Like an enemy that surrounds and fades into the crowd… Such asymmetrical battles allow for a less capable foe to turn his adversary’s strength into a weakness. These encounters are typically political in nature even when they take on the violent dimension. As might be imagined, politics is not my strong suit. Asymmetrical fights are essentially about ideas and values and require dialog, honesty, self-reflection, and creativity to win and I think I have some strengths in that area. But the political reality of such conflict strongly dictates that being right doesn’t guarantee success.
Some have and will claim my detailing of the academic freedom violation is merely whining. I think it’s more than that. I recently learned from an anonymous source that one of the email chains actually went from a CSAF executive officer (F-15C pilot) to a group of Eagle Drivers and then found its way directly into my chain of command. Email chains have popped up from the original violation and have found their way throughout my current command and despite its widespread proliferation not one person has contacted me about the discussion (other than my boss at the direction of a two-star). Even when I directly email the participants of chain emails provided to me and extend an invitation for a professional discussion to the writers I get no response. Many have shown willingness to negatively comment, insult, and pass along emails but have avoided any serious discussion of the ideas with me. If Air Force officers refuse to debate professional differences how likely is it they will be able to bring the leadership skills necessary to win the hearts and minds warfare we find ourselves engaged in now? And what is the role of our Professional Military Education in providing these skills to officers charged with winning our nation’s wars?
My professional discussion in my ACSC/DL course turned into a hit order spread across the Internet--exactly the kind of thing Air University academic freedom policy is supposed to prevent but did not. In fact, the F-15C pilot wasn’t even removed from the class despite admitting his violation even after evidence his actions infected my chain of command at the two-star level. My year in the program has demonstrated without question that ACSC/DL does not value academic freedom. That “institution” is a poster pinned to a cardboard backing with no structure or substance behind it. It is an empty shell of a program that epitomizes perception at the expense of reality and likely does more harm to the education of military officers than it does good. It is only after ACSC/DL leadership refused to remove the student from the class that I realized the program was rotten to the core and I would have to find another way to discuss ideas with peers. This blog was born of the failure of ACSC/DL to provide a basic forum for military officers to discuss and share their experiences and thoughts.
The petition for redress for my academic freedom violation was elevated to the Air University level a month and a half ago. There has still been no resolution to the issue and as far as I know the F-15C pilot hasn’t been removed from courses where he is still free to issue hits on anybody he disagrees with. I can’t help but wonder how long it takes to investigate a case with a smoking gun and a signed confession.
Sunday, July 26, 2009
Why I Believe UAVs are Better than Manned Fighters
Due to Popular Demand (written about a year ago)...
I am of the opinion that UAVs (both existing and capable of existing within months using today's technology and sufficient motivation among lawmakers and the defense industry) can provide the ISR that our warfighters in the DoD (and especially the SecDef) are demanding while simultaneously giving us an advantage beyond the F-22 and F-35 in terms of air supremacy and global strike. I also think it can be done cheaper and cost the taxpayers a great deal less money than our fleet costs us today both to purchase and to maintain. I also think it can be done relatively quickly if we can loosen the power grip of the culture of pilots running the Air Force and make the case to Congress.
So before I try to explain why I think why I do let me admit up front that I’m not a fighter pilot. Let me also say I have nothing against them and I think they do great things in certain roles and they certainly provide support I need to do my mission (much of the time). I also think they possess a great deal of flying skill required by the nature of their jobs. Unfortunately, however, they have limitations that play greatly in this discussion and some might suppose I have a chip on my shoulder for saying so. I don’t. I passed up the fighter/bomber track in pilot training for the good life of hauling cargo but after the events of 9/11 I volunteered for the Gunship and, like several in the class, ended up an attack pilot. I spent five of the last six years prosecuting interdiction, close air support, and armed recce missions and I have 1100 combat hours doing it. More importantly to this discussion, I have integrated air and ground effects hundreds of times with other aircraft including special ops assets, F-16s, F-15Es, F-18s, A-10s (once), EA-6Bs, AV-8s, Apaches and Predators. My integration has [redacted for OPSEC]. By integrate I mean sometimes employing together such as the Al Faw invasion on hit night of Iraq where I employed with a two ship of A-10s with limited coordination mostly deconfliction or with F-15Es such that coordination was required and their ordnance was dropped through my orbit or by lazing for F-16s. Most of the time, however, my integration experience is characterized by F-16s or F-15Es in the air stack well above me over an operation where the integration is on the radio and is characterized by radio communications and the passing of information and building of SA. This is key to backing up my claims. I have literally hundreds of hours in combat evaluating and building the SA of fighter aircraft. My experience leads me to conclude that single seat fighters have very low SA over the objective and provide little unless ordnance is required on a static set of coordinates. My experience with two seater F-15Es has been a little better but not significantly. I can’t offer much about my A-10 experience as we mostly just deconflicted airspace and target sets although during integrated live fire/dry fire missions with them back home in the states I was very impressed with their SA. What’s my point? My point is that single seat aircraft moving fast and flying in formation bring limited capability to a fluid ground environment. It takes a great deal of skill to bring that limited capability but in the end it’s still limited. When they would check into an air stack over an operation and contact the ground party asking for a situation update I often found myself wishing the ground party would tell them to just be quiet and wait to be called. The time they spent trying to develop the picture of what was going on took up a fair amount of time and radio chatter and once the situation changed (hostiles squirted in various directions) they generally would lose it quickly. On my aircraft we had multiple sensors and could independently track multiple targets giving us significantly more SA on the fluid dynamic. More sensors, more people, longer loiter time equated to a vastly superior amount of SA. This isn’t to say I haven’t made big mistakes or that our crew aircraft is blemish free. Comparatively, however, the more people involved and the more data (sensors) the better the outcome in my experience. This is just one major advantage UAVs bring to the table.
There will be no single seat UAVs. Each UAV will come with a host of analysts, sensor operators, and at least one weaponeer. The self induced panic and adrenaline producing fear that comes from unseasoned pilots imagining they are threatened will not be a factor although the trigger happy neophyte will still have to be guarded against (and will be with more oversight). I’ll talk more about the Blackhawk shoot down that occurred when two supersonic F-15Cs engaged a slow moving flight of helicopters later but I do want to bring up the killing of the Canadians by the F-16 pilots at Tarnak Farms because it painfully illustrates just what a limitation the pilot can be. In this situation they saw small arms fire 20,000 feet below them in an established ground fire practice range in friendly territory. They claimed the fog of war feeling of being threatened made them attack. As a reference, an AK-47 small arms machine gun (according to Wiki), has an effective range somewhere around 400 meters. The level of incompetence here is hard to translate to somebody without air sense that isn’t used to being shot at and seeing ground fire. It sounds “reasonable” to people that don’t know any better but to those with an idea the situation is staggering. I would liken it to an armored police officer that uses deadly force because he feels threatened by a four year old with a butter knife. Imagine instead of two pilots flying at 300+ knots you instead have a crew of people sitting in Vegas analyzing all the sensory data. The only thing they’re scared of is shooting the wrong people for the wrong reason. They can’t use the “self defense” excuse for incompetence or a masked trigger happy desire to be the first kid on their block to get a confirmed kill. The self defense rationale should be emphasized as it’s important. One might wonder why there aren’t lots more examples of fratricide by single seat aircraft if the SA of the single seat pilot is as limited as I make it out to be. The reason there aren’t more is because of release authority rules. Fighter/bomber aircraft ordnance employment is controlled by somebody on the ground that provides coordinates (generally) and other information to ensure the right target is hit. More importantly the pilot must get permission from that ground controller to release weapons. As such, the decision making of the single seat pilot is greatly reduced with target selection in most cases. They simply punch in coordinates, pickle, and the GPS does the rest in most modern cases. Where these sad stories arise is during exceptions to that control where the pilot, with limited SA, makes the decision. The most common example is the self defense loophole; a pilot can defend him or herself if engaged. There are other exceptions as well but they are rare. The AC-130 that I flew, however, was [redacted for OPSEC]. As the pilot I was [redacted for OPSEC]. [Redacted for OPSEC] the biggest reason was due to our many sensors, many eyes, many brains, and exceptional (though not perfect) SA. My aircraft aside, a single seat pilot (or two) is a limiting factor for several reasons including limited SA, the potential for emotional over-reaction, and the “self defense” excuse for trigger happy decisions. The multiple people and oversight a UAV will bring will bring about more rational, calm, professional decisions.
The single seat pilot is not just a limitation due to SA and decision making. He or she is also a massive physical limitation. Having a pink fleshy in the center of our flying machines requires an oxygen system, heating systems, cooling systems (which will still be needed for avionics in some fashion), pressurization systems (pressure suit or cockpit pressurization), ejection systems, and an often less than perfectly aerodynamic cockpit. How does this translate into capability loss? The aircraft must weigh more than it has to, can’t climb as high as might be desired, burns more fuel and costs more to operate, is exceedingly limited by its G maneuvering and defensive capability, is theoretically subject to more anti-aircraft threat rings, and can’t fly indefinitely (think weeks or months). The pilot is a major limitation.
UAVs have already started replacing the two obvious manned arenas….ISR and bomb dropping. There isn’t a need for much maneuvering typically in ISR collection and bomb dropping with today’s laser and GPS technology. We can still make better ISR and bomb dropping UAV platforms but when we make the next platform it should be an obvious choice to choose the unmanned version. We can expect UAVs with the stealth of the B-2, the speed of the B-1, and the payload of the B-52. Why wouldn’t we? There is nothing that requires UAVs to be small.
The heart of the fighter mafia isn’t safe from the UAV, either, although they’ve done a great job keeping the discussion out of the mainstream (although unmanned F-35 options have been discussed). It could be argued there are more benefits to unmanning air to air than any other area. The most exciting advantage is the significantly more maneuverable ability of a UAV although the heart of modern air to air engagements (especially in the theoretical early days of a conventional war with China where the “if it flys it dies” rule is in effect) remains the radar and the capability AWACs provides (another aircraft that can go unmanned). The days of Mig Alley are pretty much over and he with the best radar and missiles with the best range usually wins. There isn’t much need for a furball these days outside of the MOA back home in a training area. Paint, shoot, about face, and then confirm you got em. But certainly you may need to get closer in some circumstances. For example, if you are flying in a fairly low threat peace keeping environment dubbed “Operation Provide Comfort” enforcing a no fly zone in your supersonic F-15C and you see two possible enemy helicopters that aren’t squawking. You may want to shoot them down because they could be Hinds terrorizing the Iraqi people. But they may not be. You need to do a visual ID pass to ensure they are in fact hostile. What happened on April 14, 1994 however was two trigger happy pilots took the lives of 26 U.S. servicemen because they saw what they wanted to see and later justified their response with, you guessed it, fear they were threatened by the vastly inferior helicopters. A Hind is a threat to larger aircraft in certain circumstances but is not a credible threat to a supersonic F-15C. The F-15Cs did a visual pass within roughly 1000’ of the helicopters and at a speed of 400+ mph. The helicopters were dubbed Hinds although they were clearly not due to paint scheme and instead of the pilots following ROE to then determine the nationality of the helicopters they instead reported they were “engaged” (ie threatened or fire upon by the helicopters) and took them out. I think it’s instructive that one of the pilots flying over the burning wreckage of the helicopters said, “Stick a fork in them, they're done.” We can see again in this scenario the “self defense” excuse conjured out of thin error to allow two trigger happy neophytes to be the first kid on their block to get a confirmed kill. If I make it sound like they were a couple of kids living out their childhood movie fantasies that is because that’s exactly what I’m saying. Part of the problem here is a culture of immaturity fostered by the fighter (primarily) community where a job requiring a professional, sterile, calculating decision to kill is met by a slap sticky, cocky, unprofessional with a cloudy “cranium” that killed 26 Americans in “6 to 9 seconds” but sounded cool on the radios doing it. When that attitude and culture informs the decision to kill it’s an issue. I know this sounds over the top and if there is anything I'll take flak for it will this but I think it deserves to be said. There is a cultural immaturity I think has to be factored into the process and when that immaturity is combined with boredom and the feeling of "this may be my one shot" then young guys (and old) tend to get creative in a bad way. Now to be fair, the issue of professional killing is not at all limited to the fighter community. It’s most definitely found in my own community and I would hazard a guess it’s also found in the trailers of UAVs. It’s a human issue and [redacted for OPSEC]. But I would postulate that with the “detached killing” that comes from flying UAVs with multiple people and more oversight we will see more professional killing with limited fratricide and human collateral damage. Fog of war and “self defense” are not get out of jail free cards although, unfortunately, none of the pilots in the two examples I cited did jail time.
So how would a UAV have done a better job with the Blackhawk shootdown? First, the sensors would have been much better than the “mark one eyeball” that saw two Hinds that didn’t exist. Secondly, the visual pass could have been done supersonic, closer, and provided crystal clear digital photos to a group of people with all the resources and time necessary to make a very positive identification. The SA of the pilot would have been nothing compared to the SA of the crew on the ground. Most importantly, there would be no conjured excuse of self defense to mask unprofessional trigger happy human desires. Lastly, unprofessional human desires would be likely checked by a system of oversight.
UAVs are the answer for ISR, attack, and air to air operations. Cargo and tanker operations should stay manned for the most part (with a few specialized exceptions) because in both we will want the option to haul people. If we haul people we will require the same systems and have the same limitations as a manned aircraft so being unmanned will not be an advantage. I think we can begin developing these systems now to meet our current and future needs and will save money in the long run doing it. First, one of the advantages to UAVs is the ability to fly higher and burn less gas with less weight and fly longer (with manned or unmanned in flight refueling). This equates to less gas burned, less sortie generation required, less maintenance required (aircraft break when they stop flying more than when they are flying), and less of a forward deployed footprint needed. As [redacted for non-attribution] stated in a recent post logistics like search and rescue capability are no longer required, as well. The logistical support and force structure required to support operations will be lessened and more importantly less junk will need to be hauled across the world to support saving money and gas. We won’t be hamstrung as much by countries not letting us base in their territory and lives will be more stable for our airman improving retention and quality of life. As far as purchasing a brand new aircraft with that “new UAV” smell….that should be cheaper, as well. Less specialized systems are required (outside of the data link systems that many manned aircraft already have). The aircraft I fly now has a cost mostly accounted for by the ejection seat, as an illustration. Without all the life support systems a UAV can be much cheaper and, with the exception of air to air UAVs, a one size fits all approach can be taken for many missions. Meeting the desired ISR objectives means we will purchase in bulk driving the per unit costs down further. The UAV that provides the ISR we need today can be used to penetrate China’s IADs and drop bombs to supplement our cruise missile technology. Training for the UAVs will save money, as well, because operators don’t need to build “air sense” related to flying and feeling Gs and operating in austere environments. Like the Global Hawk most of flying becomes click and drag with a mouse. Much of that training can be accomplished easier with computer simulators lessening peace time training costs.
Let me sum up this novel. The single seat pilot is the limfac both physically and more importantly mentally with great limitations to decision making mostly owing to the real or invented “fog and friction” of being threatened and needing to invoke self defense. Every auditory and visual sense the pink fleshy pilot has in a cockpit can be accurately transmitted to operators on the ground and enhanced in near real time if not in real time providing better situational awareness. SA is not a casualty of the unmanned argument. The advantages given by going unmanned can be achieved now and will cost significantly less money. Leveraging the technology, however, will mean filling the skies with UAVs beyond the pilot production pipeline. It will mean opening up the virtual cockpit to non-pilots with less training (a year long tech school will not be required) and an Air Force that may not longer be dominated by pilots. I would think Space Command might be a good command to take over the reigns of the Air Force as I would think UAV ops would be well suited to their capabilities.
I look forward to your spears and comments.
I am of the opinion that UAVs (both existing and capable of existing within months using today's technology and sufficient motivation among lawmakers and the defense industry) can provide the ISR that our warfighters in the DoD (and especially the SecDef) are demanding while simultaneously giving us an advantage beyond the F-22 and F-35 in terms of air supremacy and global strike. I also think it can be done cheaper and cost the taxpayers a great deal less money than our fleet costs us today both to purchase and to maintain. I also think it can be done relatively quickly if we can loosen the power grip of the culture of pilots running the Air Force and make the case to Congress.
So before I try to explain why I think why I do let me admit up front that I’m not a fighter pilot. Let me also say I have nothing against them and I think they do great things in certain roles and they certainly provide support I need to do my mission (much of the time). I also think they possess a great deal of flying skill required by the nature of their jobs. Unfortunately, however, they have limitations that play greatly in this discussion and some might suppose I have a chip on my shoulder for saying so. I don’t. I passed up the fighter/bomber track in pilot training for the good life of hauling cargo but after the events of 9/11 I volunteered for the Gunship and, like several in the class, ended up an attack pilot. I spent five of the last six years prosecuting interdiction, close air support, and armed recce missions and I have 1100 combat hours doing it. More importantly to this discussion, I have integrated air and ground effects hundreds of times with other aircraft including special ops assets, F-16s, F-15Es, F-18s, A-10s (once), EA-6Bs, AV-8s, Apaches and Predators. My integration has [redacted for OPSEC]. By integrate I mean sometimes employing together such as the Al Faw invasion on hit night of Iraq where I employed with a two ship of A-10s with limited coordination mostly deconfliction or with F-15Es such that coordination was required and their ordnance was dropped through my orbit or by lazing for F-16s. Most of the time, however, my integration experience is characterized by F-16s or F-15Es in the air stack well above me over an operation where the integration is on the radio and is characterized by radio communications and the passing of information and building of SA. This is key to backing up my claims. I have literally hundreds of hours in combat evaluating and building the SA of fighter aircraft. My experience leads me to conclude that single seat fighters have very low SA over the objective and provide little unless ordnance is required on a static set of coordinates. My experience with two seater F-15Es has been a little better but not significantly. I can’t offer much about my A-10 experience as we mostly just deconflicted airspace and target sets although during integrated live fire/dry fire missions with them back home in the states I was very impressed with their SA. What’s my point? My point is that single seat aircraft moving fast and flying in formation bring limited capability to a fluid ground environment. It takes a great deal of skill to bring that limited capability but in the end it’s still limited. When they would check into an air stack over an operation and contact the ground party asking for a situation update I often found myself wishing the ground party would tell them to just be quiet and wait to be called. The time they spent trying to develop the picture of what was going on took up a fair amount of time and radio chatter and once the situation changed (hostiles squirted in various directions) they generally would lose it quickly. On my aircraft we had multiple sensors and could independently track multiple targets giving us significantly more SA on the fluid dynamic. More sensors, more people, longer loiter time equated to a vastly superior amount of SA. This isn’t to say I haven’t made big mistakes or that our crew aircraft is blemish free. Comparatively, however, the more people involved and the more data (sensors) the better the outcome in my experience. This is just one major advantage UAVs bring to the table.
There will be no single seat UAVs. Each UAV will come with a host of analysts, sensor operators, and at least one weaponeer. The self induced panic and adrenaline producing fear that comes from unseasoned pilots imagining they are threatened will not be a factor although the trigger happy neophyte will still have to be guarded against (and will be with more oversight). I’ll talk more about the Blackhawk shoot down that occurred when two supersonic F-15Cs engaged a slow moving flight of helicopters later but I do want to bring up the killing of the Canadians by the F-16 pilots at Tarnak Farms because it painfully illustrates just what a limitation the pilot can be. In this situation they saw small arms fire 20,000 feet below them in an established ground fire practice range in friendly territory. They claimed the fog of war feeling of being threatened made them attack. As a reference, an AK-47 small arms machine gun (according to Wiki), has an effective range somewhere around 400 meters. The level of incompetence here is hard to translate to somebody without air sense that isn’t used to being shot at and seeing ground fire. It sounds “reasonable” to people that don’t know any better but to those with an idea the situation is staggering. I would liken it to an armored police officer that uses deadly force because he feels threatened by a four year old with a butter knife. Imagine instead of two pilots flying at 300+ knots you instead have a crew of people sitting in Vegas analyzing all the sensory data. The only thing they’re scared of is shooting the wrong people for the wrong reason. They can’t use the “self defense” excuse for incompetence or a masked trigger happy desire to be the first kid on their block to get a confirmed kill. The self defense rationale should be emphasized as it’s important. One might wonder why there aren’t lots more examples of fratricide by single seat aircraft if the SA of the single seat pilot is as limited as I make it out to be. The reason there aren’t more is because of release authority rules. Fighter/bomber aircraft ordnance employment is controlled by somebody on the ground that provides coordinates (generally) and other information to ensure the right target is hit. More importantly the pilot must get permission from that ground controller to release weapons. As such, the decision making of the single seat pilot is greatly reduced with target selection in most cases. They simply punch in coordinates, pickle, and the GPS does the rest in most modern cases. Where these sad stories arise is during exceptions to that control where the pilot, with limited SA, makes the decision. The most common example is the self defense loophole; a pilot can defend him or herself if engaged. There are other exceptions as well but they are rare. The AC-130 that I flew, however, was [redacted for OPSEC]. As the pilot I was [redacted for OPSEC]. [Redacted for OPSEC] the biggest reason was due to our many sensors, many eyes, many brains, and exceptional (though not perfect) SA. My aircraft aside, a single seat pilot (or two) is a limiting factor for several reasons including limited SA, the potential for emotional over-reaction, and the “self defense” excuse for trigger happy decisions. The multiple people and oversight a UAV will bring will bring about more rational, calm, professional decisions.
The single seat pilot is not just a limitation due to SA and decision making. He or she is also a massive physical limitation. Having a pink fleshy in the center of our flying machines requires an oxygen system, heating systems, cooling systems (which will still be needed for avionics in some fashion), pressurization systems (pressure suit or cockpit pressurization), ejection systems, and an often less than perfectly aerodynamic cockpit. How does this translate into capability loss? The aircraft must weigh more than it has to, can’t climb as high as might be desired, burns more fuel and costs more to operate, is exceedingly limited by its G maneuvering and defensive capability, is theoretically subject to more anti-aircraft threat rings, and can’t fly indefinitely (think weeks or months). The pilot is a major limitation.
UAVs have already started replacing the two obvious manned arenas….ISR and bomb dropping. There isn’t a need for much maneuvering typically in ISR collection and bomb dropping with today’s laser and GPS technology. We can still make better ISR and bomb dropping UAV platforms but when we make the next platform it should be an obvious choice to choose the unmanned version. We can expect UAVs with the stealth of the B-2, the speed of the B-1, and the payload of the B-52. Why wouldn’t we? There is nothing that requires UAVs to be small.
The heart of the fighter mafia isn’t safe from the UAV, either, although they’ve done a great job keeping the discussion out of the mainstream (although unmanned F-35 options have been discussed). It could be argued there are more benefits to unmanning air to air than any other area. The most exciting advantage is the significantly more maneuverable ability of a UAV although the heart of modern air to air engagements (especially in the theoretical early days of a conventional war with China where the “if it flys it dies” rule is in effect) remains the radar and the capability AWACs provides (another aircraft that can go unmanned). The days of Mig Alley are pretty much over and he with the best radar and missiles with the best range usually wins. There isn’t much need for a furball these days outside of the MOA back home in a training area. Paint, shoot, about face, and then confirm you got em. But certainly you may need to get closer in some circumstances. For example, if you are flying in a fairly low threat peace keeping environment dubbed “Operation Provide Comfort” enforcing a no fly zone in your supersonic F-15C and you see two possible enemy helicopters that aren’t squawking. You may want to shoot them down because they could be Hinds terrorizing the Iraqi people. But they may not be. You need to do a visual ID pass to ensure they are in fact hostile. What happened on April 14, 1994 however was two trigger happy pilots took the lives of 26 U.S. servicemen because they saw what they wanted to see and later justified their response with, you guessed it, fear they were threatened by the vastly inferior helicopters. A Hind is a threat to larger aircraft in certain circumstances but is not a credible threat to a supersonic F-15C. The F-15Cs did a visual pass within roughly 1000’ of the helicopters and at a speed of 400+ mph. The helicopters were dubbed Hinds although they were clearly not due to paint scheme and instead of the pilots following ROE to then determine the nationality of the helicopters they instead reported they were “engaged” (ie threatened or fire upon by the helicopters) and took them out. I think it’s instructive that one of the pilots flying over the burning wreckage of the helicopters said, “Stick a fork in them, they're done.” We can see again in this scenario the “self defense” excuse conjured out of thin error to allow two trigger happy neophytes to be the first kid on their block to get a confirmed kill. If I make it sound like they were a couple of kids living out their childhood movie fantasies that is because that’s exactly what I’m saying. Part of the problem here is a culture of immaturity fostered by the fighter (primarily) community where a job requiring a professional, sterile, calculating decision to kill is met by a slap sticky, cocky, unprofessional with a cloudy “cranium” that killed 26 Americans in “6 to 9 seconds” but sounded cool on the radios doing it. When that attitude and culture informs the decision to kill it’s an issue. I know this sounds over the top and if there is anything I'll take flak for it will this but I think it deserves to be said. There is a cultural immaturity I think has to be factored into the process and when that immaturity is combined with boredom and the feeling of "this may be my one shot" then young guys (and old) tend to get creative in a bad way. Now to be fair, the issue of professional killing is not at all limited to the fighter community. It’s most definitely found in my own community and I would hazard a guess it’s also found in the trailers of UAVs. It’s a human issue and [redacted for OPSEC]. But I would postulate that with the “detached killing” that comes from flying UAVs with multiple people and more oversight we will see more professional killing with limited fratricide and human collateral damage. Fog of war and “self defense” are not get out of jail free cards although, unfortunately, none of the pilots in the two examples I cited did jail time.
So how would a UAV have done a better job with the Blackhawk shootdown? First, the sensors would have been much better than the “mark one eyeball” that saw two Hinds that didn’t exist. Secondly, the visual pass could have been done supersonic, closer, and provided crystal clear digital photos to a group of people with all the resources and time necessary to make a very positive identification. The SA of the pilot would have been nothing compared to the SA of the crew on the ground. Most importantly, there would be no conjured excuse of self defense to mask unprofessional trigger happy human desires. Lastly, unprofessional human desires would be likely checked by a system of oversight.
UAVs are the answer for ISR, attack, and air to air operations. Cargo and tanker operations should stay manned for the most part (with a few specialized exceptions) because in both we will want the option to haul people. If we haul people we will require the same systems and have the same limitations as a manned aircraft so being unmanned will not be an advantage. I think we can begin developing these systems now to meet our current and future needs and will save money in the long run doing it. First, one of the advantages to UAVs is the ability to fly higher and burn less gas with less weight and fly longer (with manned or unmanned in flight refueling). This equates to less gas burned, less sortie generation required, less maintenance required (aircraft break when they stop flying more than when they are flying), and less of a forward deployed footprint needed. As [redacted for non-attribution] stated in a recent post logistics like search and rescue capability are no longer required, as well. The logistical support and force structure required to support operations will be lessened and more importantly less junk will need to be hauled across the world to support saving money and gas. We won’t be hamstrung as much by countries not letting us base in their territory and lives will be more stable for our airman improving retention and quality of life. As far as purchasing a brand new aircraft with that “new UAV” smell….that should be cheaper, as well. Less specialized systems are required (outside of the data link systems that many manned aircraft already have). The aircraft I fly now has a cost mostly accounted for by the ejection seat, as an illustration. Without all the life support systems a UAV can be much cheaper and, with the exception of air to air UAVs, a one size fits all approach can be taken for many missions. Meeting the desired ISR objectives means we will purchase in bulk driving the per unit costs down further. The UAV that provides the ISR we need today can be used to penetrate China’s IADs and drop bombs to supplement our cruise missile technology. Training for the UAVs will save money, as well, because operators don’t need to build “air sense” related to flying and feeling Gs and operating in austere environments. Like the Global Hawk most of flying becomes click and drag with a mouse. Much of that training can be accomplished easier with computer simulators lessening peace time training costs.
Let me sum up this novel. The single seat pilot is the limfac both physically and more importantly mentally with great limitations to decision making mostly owing to the real or invented “fog and friction” of being threatened and needing to invoke self defense. Every auditory and visual sense the pink fleshy pilot has in a cockpit can be accurately transmitted to operators on the ground and enhanced in near real time if not in real time providing better situational awareness. SA is not a casualty of the unmanned argument. The advantages given by going unmanned can be achieved now and will cost significantly less money. Leveraging the technology, however, will mean filling the skies with UAVs beyond the pilot production pipeline. It will mean opening up the virtual cockpit to non-pilots with less training (a year long tech school will not be required) and an Air Force that may not longer be dominated by pilots. I would think Space Command might be a good command to take over the reigns of the Air Force as I would think UAV ops would be well suited to their capabilities.
I look forward to your spears and comments.
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